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FOREWORD

FUNDING, RELIGION, AND THE CONSTITUTION:
THE 1999 PROGRAM OF THE AALS SECTION ON
LAW AND RELIGION
HEATHER

S. GUILETTE*

The Supreme Court's traditional Establishment Clause jurisprudence is often characterized under a theory of separationism.
As is evident in the Court's 1971 opinion in Lemon v. Kurtzman,1
the rule of separation is simply this: the government must not
cause religious effects. 2 With its decision in Widmar v. Vincent' in
1981, and its subsequent decisions in Rosenberger v. Rector4 and
Agostini v. Felton,' however, the Court began to turn away from
this theory of strict separation toward a theory of neutrality. Neutrality theory is centered on a presumption that individuals make
their own religious choices, with minimal government interference.6 "The neutrality model allows individuals and religious
groups to participate fully and equally with their fellow citizens in
America's public life, without being forced either to shed or disguise their religious convictions or character. ' Nowhere is the
distinction between separationism and neutrality more evident
than in the issue of government funding to religious organizations-whether in the case of aid to schools or to faith-based
social service providers.
* Issue Editor, Notre Dame Journal of Law, Ethics & Public Policy; B.A.,
1996, University of Notre Dame;J.D. Candidate, 1999, Notre Dame Law School;
Thomas J. White Scholar, 1997-1999. The Notre DameJournal of Law, Ethics &
Public Policy would like to thank Dean John Garvey for his invaluable support
and assistance in the publication of this issue.
1. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).

2. See John H. Garvey, What's Next After Separationism?,46 EMORY L.J. 75
(1997).
3.

454 U.S. 263 (1981).

4. 515 U.S. 819 (1995).
5. 521 U.S. 203 (1997).
6. See Carl H. Esbeck, A Constitutional Case for Governmental Co-Operation
with Faith-BasedSocial Service Providers, 46 EMORY L.J. 1, 4 (1997).

7. Id.at 21.
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The articles contained in this issue were prepared for a program presented by the Section on Law and Religion at the 1999
Annual Meeting of the Association of American Law Schools
(AALS) 8 that considered this very topic. The Section's program
was divided into two separate panels. The first, moderated by CoChair John Garvey, dealt with the subject of funding and education. The second, moderated by Co-Chair Marci Hamilton, considered the issue of funding and social services.
In his article, Interpreting the Religion Clauses in Terms of Liberty, Equality, and Free-Speech Values-A CriticalAnalysis of "Neutrality Theory" and Charitable Choice, Alan Brownstein notes that, in
light of the Court's traditional separationist theory, and as a
result of the rise of neutrality theory, the Court's interpretation
of the Establishment Clause "does not represent stable constitutional doctrine today," and that "[c]hange is in the wind."9
Brownstein criticizes this change from separationism to neutrality theory for three reasons: he argues first, that neutrality theory
is not truly neutral; second, that neutrality theory is misdirected
in its objective; and third, that neutrality theory pays inadequate
attention to the positive role that government should play in promoting religious liberty and equality. In contrast to Brownstein,
in Myths, Miscues, and Misconceptions: No-Aid Separationismand the
Establishment Clause, Carl Esbeck notes the benefits of the neutrality, principle as applied to government funding programs. Esbeck
argues that neutrality, rather than the "pervasively sectarian"
standard put forth by "no-aid separationisis," provides a feasible
solution to the Establishment Clause problem involved in government funding of faith-based social service providers. Stephen
Monsma expounds on the idea of using faith-based agencies to
meet societal needs in The "Pervasively Sectarian" Standard in The8. The AALS is a non-profit association of 162 law schools. It serves as the
learned society for law teachers, and is legal education's principal
representative to the federal government and to other national higher
education organizations and learned societies. See What is the AALS? (visited
April 29, 1999) <http://www.aals.org/about.html>. The AALS holds an Annual
Meeting every year in January and five or six workshops and conferences
throughout the year. Much of the activity of the AALS is planned and
undertaken by 78 AALS Sections. These sections are interest groups composed
of members of the faculty and professional staff of AALS member schools. See
AALS Sections (visited April 29, 1999) <http://www.aals.org/sections/
index.html>. The Section on Law and Religion is co-chaired by Dean John
Garvey, of Boston College Law School, and Professor Marci Hamilton, of
Yeshiva University.
9. Alan E. Brownstein, Interpreting the'Religion Clauses in Terms of Liberty,
Equality, and Free-Speech Values-A Critical Analysis of "Neutrality Theory" and
Charitable Choice, 13 NoTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'y 243, 243 (1999).
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ory and Practice. Like Esbeck, Monsma considers in depth the separationist "pervasively sectarian" standard, and concludes that
the neutrality principle is a better solution.
In addition to its application to faith-based social service
providers, the separationism-neutrality distinction is particularly
relevant in the case of aid to religious schools-more specifically,
school vouchers. In Equal Treatment Is Not Establishment, Eugene
Volokh considers this issue generally by asking whether the Constitution requires discrimination against religious schools and the
parents who choose them. Volokh concludes that this discrimination is not required; in fact, he argues that the Constitution
compels equal treatment of, and not discrimination against, religious schools.
Ira Lupu, Abner Greene, and Ruti Teitel all consider the
separate question of the constitutionality of school vouchers. In
The IncreasinglyAnachronistic Case Against School Vouchers, Ira Lupu
analyzes the three foundational arguments against school vouchers-the distinction between direct and indirect aid, the asserted
non-neutrality of voucher arrangements, and the traditional, separationist theory of Lemon and its progeny-and concludes that
the constitutional case against school vouchers is extremely weak.
Like Lupu, in Why Vouchers Are Unconstitutional, and Why They're
Not, Abner Greene suggests that the core value promoted by the
Establishment Clause is not jeopardized by voucher programs.
Greene also considers the issue of school vouchers and other
government aid to religion in light of the Free Exercise Clause.
For her part, Ruti Teitel focuses on several political and social
trends which are generally left out of the prevailing voucher policy debate. In Vouchsafing Democracy: On the Confluence of Governmental Duty, Constitutional Right, and Religious Mission, Teitel
proposes that the debate over voucher policy should occur within
the context of three contemporary trends-namely, the devolution of traditional government functions to the private sector,
the churches' deprivatization, and a paradigm shift in recent
years of theories of knowledge. Teitel contends that consideration of this salient political context has implications for reframing the voucher debate.
The last article in this issue, Shimon Shetreet's State and Religion: Fundingof Religious Institutions-The Case of Israel in Comparative Perspective, goes beyond the American political and judicial
context that Teitel identifies, and considers the issue of funding
from a global perspective. Shetreet analyzes the relationship of
church and state in his native Israel in an effort to add a dimension to the ongoing debate in the United States about government funding and charitable choice. In light of his analysis of
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the separation of church and state in Israel, Shetreet advocates a
separationist policy. He concludes that in the voucher system
that is virtually required by neutrality theory, there is a possibility
that powerful religious institutions might take advantage of the
system and in so doing, create centers of power through the provision of social services.
In addition to the aforementioned articles concerning the
separationist-neutrality debate in the areas of educational and
social service-based funding to religious organization, this issue
contains three student notes on various topics in the broader
field of law and religion. Michelle Mack's article, Religious
Human Rights and the InternationalHuman Rights Community: Finding Common Ground-Without Compromise, concerns the field of
religious human rights, and specifically, the relationship between
the secular human rights community and religious advocates for
religious freedom. Touching on the debate concerning whether
a religious perspective is permitted to enter the "secular public
arena," Mack explores the extent to which it is either possible or
effective for her to rely upon and express her identity as a Christian, as she advocates in the secular arena for the promotion and
protection of religious human rights.
In The Immigrant First As Human: InternationalHuman Rights
Principles and Catholic Doctrine as New Moral Guidelines for U.S.
ImmigrationPolicy, Kristina Oven argues for an integration of fundamental principles of human dignity in immigration policy.
Oven maintains that there are three national,influences on immigrants which need to be "humanized:" societal attitudes toward
immigration and immigrants, immigration legislation and policy
from the federal government, and treatment of immigrants at
the border by the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS).
Finally, in The Price of Not Rendering to Caesar: Restrictions on
Church Participationin Political Campaigns, Erik Ablin considers
the Internal Revenue Code's section 501 (c) (3) provision, which,
as a condition of tax-exempt status, prohibits churches from
engaging in electioneering. Ablin explores this Code provision
in light of some contemporary controversies where various
churches have arguably crossed the line. He then provides a
brief constitutional analysis of the ban on politicking, notes several historical occasions when churches have intervened in the
political process and why they have done so, and concludes by
surveying alternative proposals that would remove the risk that a
church will lose its tax-exempt status by participating in de
minimis campaign activities.

